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Abstract 
e-Science and e-Research is about supporting 
collaborations especially those that cross 
administrative boundaries. Typically this is achieved 
through establishing virtual organizations (VOs) where 
several institutions and individuals wish to contribute 
resources for their mutual interest, e.g. to address a 
given research topic. VOs can be fluid in nature and 
any individual/cooperating entity may in principle 
join/leave or have their roles/privileges 
changed/revoked at any time. Management of such 
dynamic infrastructures is made more complex since 
they must address the overall configuration and 
management of VO-specific resources across multiple 
sites, as well as configuration and management of the 
underlying infrastructure upon which the VO exists - 
referred to in this paper as the fabric. An insecure 
fabric can undermine the security of collaborating sites 
and any threat (perceived or real) can often impede the 
operation of the whole VO. In this paper we present a 
trust-oriented policy-driven infrastructure that 
overcomes many of the issues with existing VO models 
based upon blind trust assumptions of the fabric. Our 
proposed solution extends the Globus authorization 
framework involving several decision entities before a 
patch can be pushed to a target node. 
Keywords: Grids, Virtual Organizations, 
Configuration Management, Patch Management.  
1. Introduction                                           
Virtual Organizations (VOs) [1] come in to existence 
when one or more institutions and their research 
personnel wish to collaborate and share resources. 
These  resources can be a variety of things including 
hardware such as storage servers, databases, clusters,  
supercomputers, or specialized resources such as 
visualization facilities or telescopes etc [1-3]. VOs are 
typically realized through the application of Grid 
technologies and middleware. For large-scale Grids 
involving multi-site collaborations, the installation and 
configuration of the software infrastructure needs for 
particular VOs becomes increasingly demanding and 
complex for local system administrators at given sites 
since software targeted to the needs of specific VOs 
often comes from a variety of sources including remote 
collaborators. Detailed knowledge of these software 
tools and their often prototypic nature mean that local 
administrators are left with a variety of potentially 
conflicting software and software configuration 
requirements. This is especially the case when site 
resources are shared across multiple VOs. Software 
vendors such as Microsoft and Sophos generally 
release patches to fix vulnerabilities in their software 
products, however patching heterogeneous software 
from multiple providers where dependencies exist 
between the code bases is much harder to achieve. 
Patches, if applied correctly can remove vulnerabilities 
from systems, however in some cases patches may 
break existing systems if not properly analysed and 
tested before applying. Furthermore, if applying 
patches is seen as the ‘cure-all’ to software 
vulnerabilities, then question arises why organisations 
don’t apply them as soon as they are made available? 
The problem is that patch management is multifaceted, 
and there are often operational reasons why 
organisations don’t apply them immediately. For 
example, users with the ability to install new software 
on their local machines may find that conflicts exist, 
e.g. with anti-virus or spyware software, which can 
result in the ineffectiveness of the protection software 
without the user ever knowing or even seeing a 
warning message. Other problems with traditional 
patching systems include software configured for 
manual update which  never actually occurs; users 
switching off their system earlier than the scheduled 
time for the update to take place or licenses which may 
expire causing updates not to happen etc [4].  
As a result, many systems are left un-patched for 
months, even years [5]. According to the Computer 
Emergency Response Team / Coordination Center 
(CERT/CC) [6], around 95 percent of security breaches 
could be prevented by keeping systems up-to-date with 
appropriate patches [7]. The Slammer virus, which 
swept the Internet in January 2003, caused network 
outages all around the world, affecting 911 call centers, 
airlines, ATMs. However Microsoft released the patch 
fixing the vulnerability that Slammer exploited six 
months before the incident. Similarly, Code Red and 
Nimda wreaked havoc on those companies that were 
not current with their software patch updates [8].  
This lax security process is simply not tenable for 
many security-oriented VOs. This problem is 
exacerbated where a single inadequately configured 
VO resource can endanger all other sites within a given 
VO if it does not take all appropriate measures to 
ensure its own configuration and security reflecting 
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both its own specific (autonomous) site policy and the 
agreements set in place for the VO itself. Whilst 
advanced authorization infrastructures can protect 
access to given resources, these security mechanisms 
will be made redundant if the basic underlying fabric 
upon which those services exist are themselves 
inadequately protected. This might be from numerous 
perspectives: firewalls that have been left open or 
incorrectly configured; out of date anti-virus software; 
operating systems or middleware itself that have not 
been patched with latest updates to name but a few 
examples. Ensuring that all nodes used across a VO 
have the necessary operating system, middleware and 
that the underlying fabrics are properly patched and the 
most up to date antivirus software protection is 
something that up until now has been left to the 
individual VO sites. This is something that cannot be 
left to chance however. It needs to be managed at the 
VO level. For example, a VO dealing with medical 
records or any other highly sensitive data sets demands 
that resources are protected as far as possible. It is the 
case that the middleware solutions up to now have been 
primarily targeted at isolated aspects of security, e.g. 
defining and enforcing advanced authorization 
infrastructures which can be used to protect access to 
particular services or data. We argue that a more 
integrated solution is needed that deals with end-end 
VO-wide security including VO-wide security policies 
and their enforcement which are aligned with local 
security policies and supporting the security of the 
underlying fabric upon which that VO is based. This 
requires an understanding of local and global policies 
and the ability to securely deliver and configure any 
software patches or local site configurations. One way 
in which such update and configuration can be 
supported is through configuration management tools. 
However these have to now primarily focused on a 
single domain and not tackled inter-organisational 
collaborations. Thus a typical assumption is that the 
person using the configuration management tool is the 
local administrator. This is often not the case in inter-
organisational collaborations, and remote collaborators 
may want or need to install patches on a given remote 
resource if it has been identified as compromised 
(subject to the remote security policy allowing local 
administrators to install/patch their local resource). 
 In this paper we show how VO-wide security policies 
can be defined, enforced and aligned with local 
security policies. We show how configuration 
management tools can be used to configure multiple 
resources across multiple organizations to improve the 
overall security of the VO. To illustrate this, we focus 
on identification of scenarios driving the work forward. 
  
2. Related Work 
There are numerous challenges in integrating 
configuration management tools with VO-specific 
middleware across multiple sites. Patch management 
can be thought of a subset of configuration 
management, as the latter involves configuring 
firewalls, routers, switches and other appliances used 
for connectivity within and across organizations. One 
of the most important to overcome for improved 
overall security is in how patches are applied to 
particular VO collaborator nodes.  
Huseyin et al [9] point out several reasons for not 
applying patches. Firstly, there are too many 
vulnerabilities to patch. [8] states that in an average 
week, vendors and security organizations typically 
announce over one hundred and fifty vulnerabilities 
along with information how to fix them. Secondly, 
patches cannot always be trusted without testing 
especially in production environments [10]. Prior to 
application, each patch should ideally be tested to make 
sure that it is working properly and does not conflict or 
have any side effects with existing deployed 
applications in the system. In some cases, when 
patching it is necessary to reconfigure the system 
and/or recode applications so that patches can work 
without causing any new problems. Thirdly, 
distribution of patches is often non-standard. Some 
patches are made available on vendor web sites (e.g. 
MS WSUS) and automatically pulled when needed. 
Typically a user is prompted on whether they want to 
install the downloaded patch, but there is no real 
guarantee that a given patch will not have any 
untoward side effects on existing systems. However the 
vast majority of patches and updates are not 
automatically updated. Fourthly, after installation many 
patches require testing and in some cases system 
restarts for the patch to take effect.  
Jung et al. [11] conduct a survey of patch 
management products and they found that only 4 out of 
10 products can provide protection against attacks such 
as man-in-the middle, forgery and replay. Dominic and 
Barry [12] propose an automated patch management 
architecture claiming to be a complete patch 
management system with important features of initial 
vulnerability detection, thorough to testing, deployment 
and reporting and maintenance. This was an ambitious 
project and is currently a work-in-progress so 
verification of this system working properly in 
multiplatform environments has yet to be 
demonstrated.  
In [13], Tian et. al propose an automated vulnerability 
management using web services and agent-based 
systems which scan for vulnerabilities in the Operating 
System version, services and third party applications 
running. The system sends resource profile information 
to a web service ‘scanner’ and returns all possible 
vulnerabilities. Although, this system may work fine in 
a standalone or static environment, it has not been 
tested in a multiplatform and heterogeneous 
environment where several underlying operating 
systems with wide range of policies may co-exist. 
Chang et. al [14] present a patch management model 
and architectural design for large scale heterogeneous 
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environments. This architecture is based on five layers, 
however it does not address environments when there 
are several collaborators with wide range of site/system 
policies as is typical in inter-organisational VOs, and 
where policy conflict detection and resolution are 
required. Dominic [15] in an attempt to enhance his 
previous work [12] identifies that a complete 
framework based on open source community tools is 
needed to tackle the patch management process in a 
holistic approach rather than simply patching the holes. 
Although this effort brings up several ideas for the 
research community as whole in developing complete 
patch management solutions, the extension for 
heterogeneous and multisite collaborative environment 
is not addressed. Furthermore the proposed architecture 
has not been rigorously tested in a real environment 
which makes the author’s claims unsubstantiated.  
The major configuration management vendors and 
tools like Microsoft, Altiris, Computer Associates 
International, IBM Tivoli, LANDesk etc do not have 
embedded knowledge of patch interrelationships, nor 
patch analysis capabilities when dealing with 
heterogeneous software environments comprising 
multiple software from multiple providers. Thus these 
tools are not optimized for inter-organisational and  
heterogeneous patch management, and their use is 
labor intensive [16].  
In summary, applying patches to mitigate against the 
challenges and dangers of unpatched systems in the 
face of potential attacks can be a costly business, 
however the consequences of not applying those 
updates immediately can be extreme [17]. 
3. Patch Management support through 
Configuration Management  
Configuration management tools allow for deployment 
and management and of course configuration of 
multiple software environments on heterogeneous 
infrastructures.  Such tools have evolved to allow for 
the installation and configuration of software in a given 
domain and across a closed set of resources, i.e. they 
do not deal with inter-organisational configuration 
management as required for VOs. Our previous work 
[18] undertook an evaluation of three leading 
configuration management tool sets: Cfengine [19], 
SmartFrog [20] and OGSAconfig [21]. We showed 
how it is possible to use these tools to deploy a variety 
of Grid software, other software (such as Java) and 
indeed support data management activities that are 
commonly required for a particular VO. The work 
described here extends that work through dealing with 
the security aspects of exploitation of configuration 
management software tools for VO-specific patch 
management. 
VO security can be achieved in two principle ways: 
decentralized security where trust relationships exist 
between different organizations which are used to 
define and enforce local access control decisions, e.g. 
bilateral agreements. Alternatively, centralised security 
models assume some agreement across all of the VO-
sites and users that are participating in a given 
collaboration. One example of the former is the 
Internet2 Shibboleth technology where multiple 
individual federated Identity Providers (IdP) can be 
used for authentication and delivery of signed attributes 
to service providers (SP) which can subsequently be 
used for access control. An example of centralized 
security is the Virtual Organisation Membership 
Service (VOMS) where a centralized attribute authority 
is defined and used to provide credentials used for 
access control decisions. Hybrid combinations of these 
centralized and decentralized security models are 
possible. The advantages and disadvantages of these 
models are compared in [22].  
The actual authorization decisions that are made can 
be undertaken in a variety of ways using a variety of 
technologies: Role Based Access Control (RBAC) is 
one of the more common approaches. The PERMIS 
technology (www.permis.org) provides an X509 based 
RBAC infrastructure that has been extended to work 
with a variety of middleware commonly used to 
support VOs including the Globus Grid middleware 
(www.globus.org) and the Open Middleware 
Infrastructure Initiative (OMII-UK – www.omii.ac.uk) 
and the Internet2 Shibboleth technology. Through 
digitally signed Security Assertion Markup Language 
(SAML) [23] assertions, finer grained security can be 
supported where VO-specific roles can be delivered 
and subsequently used to determine for example 
whether the credentials that are supplied (either 
through Shibboleth or from VOMS) meet the security 
requirements from the local (protected) service 
provider. 
To explore the challenges of VO-specific patch 
management, we consider both centralized and 
decentralized models for patch management in a 
distributed environment. In particular we focus upon 
VO-specific patch management across multiple 
collaborating sites. For brevity we assume use of 
CFengine as the configuration management tool but 
this can be generalized to other tools such as 
SmartFrog or OGSAconfig.  
CFengine [19]  is an open source tool widely used for 
policy host configuration systems. It includes a high 
level policy language and a low level logic engine. At 
start-up, CFengine retrieves a policy definition from a 
central place (server) and then tries to adapt the local 
system to that policy. The cfenvd daemon which is part 
of CFengine collects local system statistics in order to 
detect abnormal behaviour [2].  
In [18] we assumed a single domain model where the 
privileges required to run this script existed across all 
nodes where deployment and configuration was 
required. However in inter-organisational 
collaborations such assumptions are rarely likely to be 
the case. Rather precise specification of the rules and 
regulations on who is allowed to install what patch and 
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configure what software on which resources needs 
precise specification and subsequent enforcement. 
Furthermore understanding of the software 
dependencies on the deployed nodes and the potential 
vulnerabilities that may or may not exist on a given 
node must be clearly understood before any patch 
management can be achieved.  
 
4. Proposed Solution 
To tackle this, two key components of the 
infrastructure that we put forward for security-oriented 
patching of particular VOs through configuration 
management include: 
• VO-Knowledge Base (VOkb): in our current 
implementation this is a MySQL database that 
contains an inventory of all information of the 
nodes in the VO. This includes the specific 
operating system version, the service packs/RPMs, 
patch information, applications, libraries and 
antivirus softwares installed on the VO nodes. 
• VO-Vulnerability Data Base (VOvb): contains 
announced vulnerabilities and advisories from 
recognized sources of information for that particular 
VO. This might be through information sources such 
as CVE [24], Bugtraq [25], CERT [6], or recognized 
middleware providers such as Globus etc. 
To understand the interplay of these components in the 
patching and configuration of a particular VO we 
outline typical interactions that take place as shown in 
Figure 1. To being with we assume that a VO 
administrator (VOad) receives an alert from a 
recognized software authority that a given vulnerability 
has been found in a particular software component. The 
VO administrator retrieves this software update and 
checks that it has been digitally signed by the 
recognized authority, e.g. that the MD5 checksums are 
correct, and when this is the case they check with the 
VOkb as to whether any of the nodes existing in the VO 
are affected.  When this is the case, information on the 
update is added to the VOvb. This includes meta-data 
on the update such as where it was downloaded from; 
who validated its authenticity; the software 
vulnerability it addresses and the nodes that are 
impacted by this update. 
We note access to the VOkb and VOvb is restricted and 
requires fine grained authorization. This is achieved 
through VOad specific credentials being required when 
querying or updating the VOkb or VOvb. We also note 
that it is quite possible for multiple individuals to hold 
the VOad role or indeed have different roles that are 
allowed access to subsets of the information in 
VOkb/VOvb. This might be the case for example when 
an administrator can only administer subsets of the 
resources across the VO, e.g. only those in a given 
institution for example. It is equally possible that a 
VOad can delegate their credentials to other known and 
trusted individuals subject to VO policy. One way that 
this can be achieved is through the JISC funded 
DyVOSE project Delegating Issuing Service (DIS) 
which is described in [26]. 
The default for access to VO-specific resources is set 
to deny, i.e. unless authentic and valid credentials are 
presented then access to these resources is denied. 
Once authorized access to the VOkb and VOvb has 
shown that there are indeed nodes across the VO that 
are impacted by this particular update, i.e. a security 
hole exists, a CFengine script is auto-generated and 
parameterized with the update itself; the hosts that are 
affected and the credentials of the VO administrator. 
An execution plan for the CFengine script is 
subsequently derived and sent to each node that is 
affected along with the credentials of the VOad. Each 
node that receives this update will use the VOad  
credentials and the update information itself to make a 
local authorisation decision. We emphasise this point 
since it is at the heart of the solution we propose. A 
given resource provider must be able to guarantee that 
a request to install an update or configure a given local 
resources comes from an authentic, valid and above all 
trusted authority. 
 
Figure 1: Policy-driven patch management in a 
single VO environment 
In Figure 1, to make sure that the target patch does not 
cause any untoward effects on nodes it needs to be 
tested for conflicts/dependencies issues. This is 
achieved by testing it in a virtual test environment. 
Once all these tests have been passed by the system 
administrator can push the received patch to the central 
CFengine server. At this point an authorization 
decision is made according to central policy specified 
to ensure that the system-administrator is allowed to 
push this patch through to the CFengine server. Based 
upon the privileges of the system administrator, a 
decision is made as to which nodes the administrator’s 
patch is allowed to be sent to. This decision will be 
based both on the VO policy to which the node belongs 
to and its trust relationship with the CFengine server; 
the patch itself and the parameters such as 
authorization credentials for remote administrators, the 
target node, agreed with VO policy. If privileges allow 
then the CFengine will submit the CFengine script to 
the remote nodes where it will be intercepted by a local 
policy enforcement point (PEP) which restricts access 
4a
4b
Virtual Test Environment 
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to a local service which itself protects access to a local 
CFengine daemon. However, the ‘allow’ decision will 
be based on the fact that if node is affected; there are 
no conflicts, and the VO policy is satisfied. Assuming 
that the privileges presented are authentic, sufficient 
and agree with the local policy and there are no 
dependencies or side-effects on the target node, the 
script will be forwarded to the daemon and installation 
and configuration of the patch can takes place.  The 
workflow of the above mentioned activities are 
demonstrated below by showing Authorization 
decisions in Figure 2.   
At layer-1 (patch arrival & analysis layer) a system 
admin receives a patch from a software vendor (step-
1). At (step 2) the received patch will be further 
confirmed for its legitimacy from independent sources 
such as Bugtraq etc at the VO vulnerability database 
(VODB). If no vendor digital signatures are found the 
patch will be dropped straight away (step 3); in case of 
a genuine patch containing authentic digital signatures 
it would be forwarded to the VOkb to check if any 
affected target nodes exist in the VO (step 4). In case 
no node is affected the patch is dropped (step 5) 
otherwise if an affected node is found a positive 
decision will come (step 6) 
Figure 2: Workflow of the patch activities from 
receiving to installation 
At layer-2 (patch test layer), the received patch is 
tested in a virtual environment containing an image of 
the target node. At this layer once the patch has been 
successfully tested (step 7) it would be sent to the 
central Cfengine server; in case of test failure (step 8) 
the patch would be dropped.  At this level the 
authorization decisions will depend upon the presented 
credentials of the VO administrator (VOad). If the 
presented credentials are not valid or have been 
revoked then a ‘deny’ decision will be issued (step 9). 
Otherwise, if the credentials are authentic and valid an 
allow decision will be made and the script and other 
parameters such as target nodes for installation via 
CFservd ‘server daemon’ will be sent to the affected 
nodes. We note that at the central Cfengine server the 
cfservd is protected by the central policy which 
requires that only administrators with valid credentials 
can install patches on the VO nodes. If the system 
admins credentials have been revoked or are not valid 
then access will be denied (step-10).  
At layer-3 (installation layer), the local VO policy is 
used to check the credentials for the installation of 
patch to take place i.e. sites are autonomous. If a 
system admin has valid credentials in accordance with 
the local policy then the patch is accepted (step-12) 
else access is denied (step-11). Once an authorization 
decision is made in favor of the remote administrator 
(step 13) the patch installation can take place and 
feedback/update about successful installation of the 
patch is reported back to the knowledge base (step-14). 
  
5. Authorization Components & 
Implementation 
To address the security requirements of Figure 3, fine 
grained access control is needed. Contemporary role 
based access control models (RBAC) such as PERMIS 
[27] are not sufficient in detecting conflicting 
situations/scenarios which involve more than one 
subject or more precisely PERMIS only supports local 
authorization decisions where in reality VO-wide 
authorization decisions are needed, e.g. combining 
decisions from multiple PDPs simultaneously. 
Extended RBAC models  such as eXtended Access 
Control Markup Language (XACML) [28] support 
such situations when there are several entities involved 
in the decision making process. Our implementation 
accommodates credentials/attributes certificates issued 
by several entities and policies expressed by dissimilar 
domains, e.g. using Access Control Lists (ACL), 
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) 
callouts, centralized issued Virtual Organization 
Membership service (VOMS) [29] attributes or 
decentralized Shibboleth issued credentials. The 
services they protect are implemented in Globus.  
5.1 The GT4 Authorization Framework 
The Web Services Resource Framework (WSRF) 
offers a convergence of Grid and Web services. WSRF 
offers specifications for interoperability of Grid 
security. In a particular Grid system, each domain has 
its own security policy such as a grid-mapfile, ACL, 
CAS, SAML authorization decision and/or XACML 
policy statements. Since not all of the above mentioned 
authorization requirements were addressed in the 
XACML specification. Lang et. al [30] designed and 
implemented the Globus Toolkit version4 (GT4) 
authorization framework. The GT4 authorization 
framework implements SAML and uses the XACML 
model. It is composed of one or more Policy 
Enforcement Points (PEP), Policy Decision Points 
(PDP), and Policy Information Points (PIP). We have 
162
Authorized licensed use limited to: UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW. Downloaded on February 24,2010 at 09:48:27 EST from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
extended the implementation of the Globus 
Authorization (GT) framework. When a request for a 
patch update arrives at the Globus protected CFengine 
server, the PEP in the Globus authorization engine 
intercepts it and sends a decision request to the Globus 
PDP which in turn calls a Master PDP (extended from 
Globus authorization framework). The master PDP 
collects information needed by calling multiple PDPs 
as specified in the security configuration file. These 
include PDPs for the VOKB, VOvb and the global VO-
policy. When the master PDP receives the decisions 
returned by each PDP, it combines the decisions, using 
a policy combination algorithm to render a final 
decision, and returns the decision to the PEP. The PEP 
then executes the decision, either denying or permitting 
the request. The master PDP which is responsible for 
decision making on who is authorized to access/invoke 
cfservd daemon has been designed to be extensible. 
Currently these checks whether the patch is in the 
vulnerability list in the database (PDPvo) whether the 
patch effects any VO nodes and also to make sure that 
any request/actions are in accordance with the overall 
VO policy and that no violation VO rules exists. If any 
of these PDPs return a deny then the patch is not 
installed and a deny exception is raised. Numerous 
refinements to this policy are possible. Thus it might be 
the case that a subset of nodes only needs to be 
patched. Once an authorization decision is reached by 
the Master PDP it may still be the case that a given 
local PDP denies access. This might be for example if 
that node is currently running jobs for example and 
patching at that time is not possible. We are currently 
looking at extensions to the authorization framework to 
support such scenarios. 
 
6. Conclusions and Future Work 
In this paper we have presented a policy based 
approach for installing and dealing with patches across 
VO nodes exploiting configuration management tools 
such as CFengine. We have shown how it is possible to 
dynamically express policies. A key aspect of our work 
is how we can use a variety of security mechanisms to 
install and configure patches. We have exploited 
CFengine and extend GT4 authorization framework for 
this purpose.  
The work has identified numerous open issues with the 
patch management of distributed systems like. The 
work described here is still quite nascent and we expect 
to explore a range of future research directions. 
Examples of the kinds of research challenges we 
expect to explore include issues of dependency 
management, e.g. when conflicting software 
requirements exist. How do remove those conflicts if 
software is already installed across nodes in a VO? 
Other aspects we are considering using virtualization 
techniques to test patches before they are pushed to VO 
nodes. Similarly the work of cloud computing has 
direct parallels with what we propose here. The work 
of inter-disciplinary/inter-cloud interoperability can 
benefit greatly from the work described here. 
In the future, an extension to this work will be looking 
the pros and cons of centralized and decentralized 
models for security policies. Key to adoption of this 
kind of approach are standards and technologies that 
facilitate the expression and enforcement of patch 
management policies. One issue we have already 
identified in this is the level of granularity in 
expressing patch installation and rollback privileges. 
That is, we wish to allow VO administrators to install 
software pertinent to their VO, but not allow 
unrestricted access to install arbitrary code. 
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